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THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN

WEST VIRGINIA
MICHAEL

J. FARRELL*

The preparation and trial of a medical malpractice case is a
trial lawyer's delight. The trial arena presents a unique opportunity for the lawyer, physician, patient, and jury to explore the intricacies of a surgical procedure, the maze of a diagnostic puzzle, and
the mystery of malpractice causation.
The physician is subjected to intense scrutiny by professional
malpractice witnesses; he is compelled to justify every note in his
record and every omission in his thought process. The lawyer undertakes the herculean task of learning anatomy, physiology, and
the specific medical discipline of the defendant. It is in this context
that a review of the law of medical malpractice in West Virginia
will be explored with appreciation to those who have blazed the
path.' This analysis of West Virginia law will demonstrate that the
untimely death of a patient or an unexpected complication alone
does not make a physician negligent.'
A national study exploring the causes and effects of medical
malpractice concludes that no malpractice crisis really exists.3 The
study is valuable in ascertaining what areas of medical treatment
produce the greatest number of malpractice claims4 and indicates
B.S., Marshall University, 1969; J.D., West Virginia University, 1974; Part-
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I Posten, Law of Malpractice in West Virginia, 41 W. VA. L.Q. 35 (1934);
Foster, Juridical Trauma and Medical Shock, 59 W. VA. L. Ray. 1 (1956); G.
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(1964).,

Most medical procedures have a risk of failure. Failure by a physician to cure
as well as to prevent unexpected injury precipitates malpractice actions. The widely
accepted indirect stimuli of these actions include deficient or lost rapport with the
treating physician and non-verbal criticism by follow-up physicians or nurses.
Other contributing factors are collection suite, misleading explanations, and exaggerated prognoses. D. LouisELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §§ 5.01-.11
(1977).
2

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S

COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
Id. at 9. Nationally, 57.2% of all claim files closed in 1970 involved surgical
procedures. In West Virginia, 17% of all published medical malpractice opinions
involved surgical operations.
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that the changing patterns of medical practice from family physician to the super-specialist clinic has brought about an increase in
5
malpractice claims.
The depersonalizing aspects of a patient being hospitalized,
operated upon, and released without substantial personal input by
the physician creates an unhealthy atmosphere. The prominent
role which hospitalg have assumed in the dispensing of health care
-has also made hospitals the primary situs of the alleged malpractice.'
The generic use of the term "malpractice" 7 has severe social
and economic connotations. Generally, a physician accused of malpractice can become stigmatized by the public as an incompetent
physician. More importantly, a physician found guilty of medical
malpractice by a jury can lose his license to practice medicine.8
I Id. at 3.
6 Id. at 9. The 1970 claims figures show that 74% of all alleged malpractice
occurs in hospitals. Among the published West Virginia decisions, hospitals were
named defendants in 47.1% of the cases. Hospitals were the situs of the alleged
malpractice in approximately 85% of the cases.
"Malpractice" literally means bad practice. It is generally understood to be
a deviation from the standard of care which an ordinary, careful, prudent, and
skillful physician or surgeon, practicing in the same or similar locality and practicing in the same field of medicine at or about the same time, would have done under
the same or similar circumstances. Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252, 12 S.E. 519
(1890).
As a historical note, see Sandor, The History of ProfessionalLiability Suits in
the United States, 163 J.A.M.A. 459 (1957).
A physician may have his license to practice suspended or revoked if he is
known to engage in malpractice. W. VA. CODE § 30-3-6 (1976 Replacement Vol.)
provides:
The medical licensing board may refuse to grant a certificate of license
to a person who has been found guilty of a felony as decreed by a court
of law, or to a person known to indulge in gross immorality, or to a person
who is addicted to drunkenness or the habitual use of narcotic drugs, or
to a person known to engage in malpractice, or to a person who resorts to
fraud in procuring the certificate and may suspend or revoke a certificate
for like cause. No such refusal, suspension or revocation shall be ordered
by reason of the individual belonging to or practicing in any particular
school or system of medicine.
The statutory variances in West Virginia regarding the effect of professional
malpractice is shocking. An attorney may have his license suspended or annulled
by a judge who "observes any malpractice." W. VA. CODE: § 30-2-7 (1976 Replacement Vol.) provides in relevant part:
If the supreme court of appeals or any court of record of this State, except
the county court, observe any malpractice therein by an attorney, or if
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complaint, verified by affidavit, be made to any such court of malpractice
by any attorney therein, such court shall order the attorney to be summoned to show cause why his license shall not be suspended or annulled ...
The failure to provide a statutory definition of malpractice has been previously
criticized. Farrell, Ethics Committee Changes-Enoughor Too Much, 4 W. VA. ST.
B.J. 57 (1978). On April 3, 1979, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
approved the deletion of W. VA. STATE BAR CONST. art. VI, § 25, which set forth
the procedure for disbarring and suspending attorneys for malpractice. This section
modeled W. VA. CODE § 30-2-7 (1976 Replacement Vol.). The vagueness of the term
"malpractice" was a principal reason for the deletion.
Dental malpractice will not result in the suspension or revocation of the dentist's license. The license can be revoked for gross ignorance or gross inefficiency in
the profession. W. VA. CODE § 30-4-7 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
The Board of Examiners for Registered Nurses may suspend or revoke a license
upon proof that the nurse is "unfit or incompetent by reason of negligence, habits
or other causes." W. VA. CODE § 30-7-11 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
However, a practical nurse can be negligent or commit malpractice without
jeopardizing her license. W. VA. CODE § 30-7A-10 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
An optometrist who commits "gross malpractice" can have his certificate of
registration revoked or suspended. W. VA. CODE § 30-8-8 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
Gross negligence by an accountant can cause revocation or suspension of the
certified public accountant certificate. W. VA. CODE § 30-9-9 (1976 Replacement
Vol.).
A veterinarian's license can be revoked or suspended after an administrative
hearing board finds, by a concurrence of four members, that "incompetence, gross
negligence or other malpractice" occurred in the practice of veterinary medicine.
W. VA. CODE § 30-10-12 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
The only statute to define malpractice pertains to chiropodist-podiatrists. W.
VA. CODE § 30-11-8 (1976 Replacement Vol.):
The medical licensing board may refuse to grant a license to a person
6onvicted of a felony or guilty of gross immorality or addicted to drunkenness or the habitual use of narcotic drugs, and may by legal proceedings
as provided in article one [§30-1-1 et seq.] of this chapter suspend or
revoke a license for like cause, or for malpractice, or for fraud in procuring
the license, but no such refusal, suspension or revocation shall be ordered
by reason of the individual belonging to or practicing in any particular
school or system of chiropody or podiatry: Provided, however, that malpractice as herein used means bad, wrong or injudicious treatment of a
patient, professionally and in respect to the particular disease or injury,
resulting in injury, unnecessary suffering, or death to the patient and
proceeding from ignorance, carelessness, want of professional skill, gross
disregard of established rules or principles, neglect, or a malicious or
criminal intent.
This statutory definition of malpractice is patently absurd. Every practitioner has
caused one patient to suffer unnecessarily as a result of bad, wrong, or injudicious
treatment.
An osteopathic' physician may have his license revoked upon a showing of
"gross malpractice." W. VA. CODE § 30-14-11 (1976 Replacement Vol.). A midwife
can be sanctioned for "gross negligence." W. VA. CODE § 30-15-6 (1976 Replacement
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The vagueness of the term malpractice does not prevent courts
from reaching verdicts. Malpractice, like any other negligence
based action, is subject to the equation of duty, breach, causation,
and damages Malpractice cases have some unique features such
as non-negligence based theories of recovery.'" Each of these theories as well as the negligence approach also has the unique feature
that expert testimony regarding causation is necessary to make a
prima facie case."
The protection of medical malpractice victims by court interpretations has been expanding in recent years. The most notable
expansion involved the creation of the "discovery rule" which
holds that the statute of limitations does not begin to run against
a claim until the injured party knows or should have known of the
2
alleged malpractice.'
Malpractice defendants usually are physicians, hospitals, and
their agents, servants or employees. As defendants, they are liable
for primary negligence and the vicarious acts of those whom they
control." The business format, partnership or medical corporation,
chosen by the physician will determine the personal exposure
which a physician has for vicarious liability. A hospital's vicarious
liability can arise from the negligence by commission or omission
of its agents, servants, or employees.'" A hospital's primary negligence can range from negligent selection of incompetent employees
to maintaining an unsafe premises.'"
Vol.). Chiropractors can lose their license upon a showing of "malpractice." W. VA.
CoDE

§ 30-16-8 (1976 Replacement Vol.).

The general absence of due process in these disciplinary statutes is appalling.
A call to the legislature for corrective action is hereby made.
' The traditional negligence equation generally requires only three elements:
(1) a legal duty, (2) breach of the duty, and (3) a proximate cause relationship
between the breach and the damages.
10Breach of a special contract to cure, lack of informed consent, and abandonment are non-negligence based causes of action.

1, The expert witness rule is the best evidence of the flexibility of the common
law to remedy wrongs with justice to all concerned. See Hinkle v. Martin, 256
S.E.2d 768 (W. Va. 1979).
12 Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).
'3 Vicarious liability attaches without personal fault if the physician's employee or partner is found liable. Cook v. Coleman, 90 W. Va. 748, 111 S.E. 750
(1922).

" Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, 149 W. Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d 754 (1965).
" Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp., 149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965); Fisher
v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 137 W. Va. 723, 73 S.E.2d 667 (1952).
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This article will canvas the prerequisites to a malpractice action as well as probe the theories of liability, defenses, and immunities.
I.

PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP

A physician must accept a patient before a duty of care arises.
The physician-patient relationship generally is grounded in contract, express or implied.
An express contract to achieve a particular result is termed a
"special contract."' 8 An implied contract between patient and
physician requires the use of ordinary and reasonable care comparable to that possessed by average physicians in a similar community.'1 Beyond the contractual physician-patient relationship, a
physician may become a "fiduciary" to the patient which requires
that the physician do more than merely meet the medical standard
of care.'"
The existence of a physician-patient relationship is a prerequisite to creating the duty of care.' 9 No West Virginia case has
held a physician liable to a patient without proof of the physicianpatient relationship.
This relationship arises most often when the patient directly
employs the physician."0 The socio-economic roots of West Virginia
26

Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W. Va. 400, 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965). "Special con-

tract" is a term of art in West Virginia medical-legal jurisprudence.
17Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252, 12 S.E. 519 (1890). Every patient enters
into an implied contract with the physician in which the physician agrees to render
proper medical services for the stated remuneration. The performance of the physician is measured by the tort standard of due care. Deviation from this standard is
actionable only in tort.
IsFiduciary implies additional obligations of trust flowing from the physician
to the patient. Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 139 Cal. App. 2d 326, 293 P.2d 816 (1956);
Stafford v. Shultz, 42 Cal. 2d 767, 777, 270 P.2d 1, 8 (1954); Bowman v. McPheeters,
77 Cal. App. 2d 795, 800, 176 P.2d 745, 748 (1947). An additional case involving a
fiduciary obligation required the cooperation of the physician in litigation connected with the injury treated. Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa. Super. Ct. 79, 177 A.2d
142 (1962). This is a reasonable expectation that many West Virginia health care
practitioners reject outright or effectively reject by demanding disproportionate

payments to testify or to write medical reports.
1"A good discussion of this requirement is found in Buttersworth v. Swint, 53
Ga. App. 602, 186 S.E. 770 (1936), where the court held that neither gratuitous
medical advice by a physician nor the employer-employee relationship created a
physician-patient relationship.

" Hinkle v. Martin, 256 S.E.2d 768 (W. Va. 1979).
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interposed the "company store" concept into the selection of a
physician whereby the coal company was responsible for forming
the relationship by supplying competent physicians to the miners." The physicians were sometimes employed directly by the coal
company. At other times, they were merely retained. The difference is significant since the employee retained the right to sue his
employer directly when the physician retained by the company
committed malpractice."
Parents can also create the necessary physician-patient relationship when they employ the physician on behalf of their child."
A non-consensual physician-patient relationship can arise
when a physician exceeds the scope of his limited authority. For
example, a physician-patient relationship is generally not created
when a physician performs a physical examination for an employer, insurer, the court, or adverse litigants.Y However, if a physician subsequently renders treatment to the patient, with or without authority from the employer or insurer, then the relationship
attaches.n
I
2 See Maxwell v. Howell, 114 W. Va. 771, 174 S.E. 553 (1934); Ashby v. Davis
Coal & Coke Co., 95 W. Va. 372, 121 S.E. 174 (1924); Jenkins v. Charleston Gen.
Hosp. & Training School, 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S.E. 560 (1922); cf. Neil v. Flynn
Lumber Co., 71 W. Va. 708, 77 S.E. 324 (1913) (lumber company supplying physician to employees). See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 564 (1967).
n Ashby v. Davis Coal & Coke Co., 95 W. Va. 372, 121 S.E. 174 (1924); Neil
v. Flynn Lumber Co., 71W. Va. 708,77 S.E. 324 (1913). In Ashby, the coal company
charged the plaintiff a fee for medical services to be rendered in a case of injury or
illness by competent physicians whom the defendant represented would be employed for that particular purpose. Mr. Ashby believed that he had been the victim
of malpractice by an incompetent physician retained by the coal company. The
court held that the employee had a direct action against the employer for the
malpractice of the physician on the theory of breach of implied contract.
2 See Browning v. Hoffman, 86 W. Va. 468, 103 S.E. 484 (1920).
24 Hoover v. Williamson, 236 Md. 250, 203 A,2d 861 (1964); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Evans, 183 Miss. 859, 184 So. 426 (1938); Bouligny v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 133 S.W.2d 1094 (Mo. App. 1939); New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Wiler, 124
Ohio St. 118, 177 N.E. 205 (1931); Lotspeich v. Chance Vought Aircraft, 369 S.W.2d
705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Simecek v. State, 243 Wis. 439, 10 N.W.2d 161 (1943).
Direct actions against the employer are maintainable for injuries negligently inflicted during the examination. Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 308 N.Y. 116,
123 N.E.2d 801 (1954); New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Wiler, 124 Ohio St. 118, 177
N.E. 205 (1931); Jones v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 Minn. 217, 136 N.W. 741
(1912). See Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1071 (1966).
21Tompkins v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 53 W. Va. 479, 44 S.E. 439 (1903)
(physician-patient relationship did arise where physician altered the status quo of
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Hospitals are subject to the same legal principles. The patient
will present himself for care and treatment at the hospital through
the auspices of a physician. Emergency care patients often arrive
at a hospital involuntarily in an unconscious state. Once the hospital undertakes to care for the patient from either source, a duty of
care attaches.26
There is no legal requirement that a public or private hospital
in West Virginia accept or treat patients presenting themselves
at the hospital door.Y However, several jurisdictions reject this
"no duty" rule when the patient is acutely ill.2 This should be
the interpretation accepted in West Virginia since our statute
requires mandatory admission of all persons requiring hospital
care to state operated emergency hospitals.Y
Good Samaritan first aid does not create a physician-patient
relationship." However, a Good Samaritan physician may waive
examinee's physical condition and injury resulted from an insurance company examination).
2 Utter v. United Hosp. Center, 236 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1977); Duling v.
Bluefield Sanitarium, 149 W. Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d 754 (1965); Hogan v. Clarksburg
Hosp. Co., 63 W. Va. 84, 59 S.E. 943 (1907).
21At common law, a hospital owed no duty to render emergency care. Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934); Natale v. Sisters of
Mercy, 243 Iowa 582, 52 N.W.2d 701 (1952); Levin v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, 186
Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946). There is a discernible pattern of change regarding this
rule. See Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hosp., 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975);
Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 86
(Smith-Hurd 1966); N.Y. Pus. HALTH L. § 2806(1) (Cum. Supp. 1979). But cf.
Harper v. Baptist Med. Center, 341 So. 2d 133 (Ala. 1976) (The rendering of emergency care does not necessarily require that the hospital admit the patient.).
Is Despite the common law rule, many courts have imposed a duty of treatment
in critical care situations. Pneumonia: Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del.
15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961); Barcia v. Society of New York Hosp., 30 Misc. 2d 526, 241
N.Y.S.2d 373 (1963). Wounds/Fractures: Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575
(Fla. 1956); Williams v. Hospital Auth., 119 Ga. App. 626, 168 S.E.2d 336 (1969).
See Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 841 (1971).
2 W. VA. CODE § 26-8-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
West Virginia has two Good Samaritan statutes. Neither- creates a
physician-patient relationship. W. VA. CODE § 55-7-15 (1966) provides:
No person, including a person licensed to practice medicine or dentistry,
who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of an accident,
without remuneration, shall be liable for any civil damages as the result
of any act or omission in rendering such emergency care.
W. VA. CODE § 30-3B-4 (1976 Replacement Vol.) provides:
No physician or surgeon, who in good faith gives emergency instructions
to such paramedic, nor any such paramedic who renders such emergency
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this immunity and create a physician-patient relationship if he
attempts to charge the patient for the services. 3 There is no reported West Virginia case interpreting the limits of the immunity.
There is no authority that requires a private physician to accept every patient who seeks his services.2 Any other rule would
result in socialized medicine.
However, once the physician accepts a sick patient, the relationship continues for the duration of the illness or until it is
terminated by mutual consent or revoked by the express dismissal
of the physician by the patient." Neglect or temporary absence
from the patient by the treating physician during the treatment
phase is actionable upon proof of harm proximately caused by the
absence."
A doctor does not. become the prisoner of his patient for life.
Following the termination of the illness, he may unilaterally terminate the relationship if he gives the patient reasonable notice of
treatment as provided for herein, shall be liable for any civil damages
resulting from such emergency treatment.
This immunity is not absolute. Apparently, a jury issue would be presented by a
showing of "bad faith" by the Good Samaritan.
11Cf. Colby v. Schwartz, 78 Cal. App. 3d 885, 144 Cal. Rptr. 624 (1978). The
California Good Samaritan statute does not apply to physicians who render emergency care in a hospital emergency room. Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 222 (1971); Note,
Good Samaritansand Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1301
(1964); 51 CAL. L. REv. 816 (1963); 32 TENN. L. REv. 287 (1965). There is scant
authority on this subject which indicates either that there are no good samaritans
or no complaining accident victims.
32 Physicians who do not intend to accept a patient should maintain a file
which shows the name of the patient and the date of rejection. Absent this type of
documentation, a patient can create a justiciable issue by swearing that the doctor
accepted him or her for treatment.
1 Buskirk v. Bucklew, 115 W. Va. 424, 176 S.E. 603 (1934); Howell v. Biggart,
108 W. Va. 560, 152 S.E. 323 (1930); Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W. Va. 159, 168, 16
S.E. 564, 567 (1892).
1 Maxwell v. Howell, 114 W. Va. 771, 174 S.E. 553 (1934) (failure to visit
patient in hospital for five days on one occasion and eight days on another); Young
v. Jordan, 106 W. Va. 139, 145 S.E. 41 (1928) (obstetrician has absolute duty to
remain with expectant mother once he has induced labor); cf. Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922). In Browning,the plaintiff was hospitalized
with a broken leg. The defendant had to be out of town during the hospitalization
period. During defendant's absence, the plaintiff developed gangrene which necessitated amputation of the leg. A cause of action was not stated based solely on Dr.
Hoffman's absence since he left a qualified physician in charge and adequate instructions with the nursing staff.
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that intention so that the patient may secure a successor physician."

II. DuTY OF CARE
A.

Special Contract To Cure

West Virginia jurisprudence has recognized the validity of a
special contract to cure since the first medical malpractice case
was decided." The standard of care in a special contract case is to
cure the patient completely."7 The special contract can be created
by the physician making representations as to his success ratio and
the degree of pain to which the patient will be subjected. In
Schroeder,18 the plaintiff testified that she told the defendant that
she did not want to have bumps on each foot. He asked her to let
him remove them and represented to her that he removed such
bumps as often as fifteen or twenty-five times each week and that
if she did not have the bumps removed, she would likely begin to
have corns. In response to her question regarding risks, the chiropodist replied that they were insignificant and that she would be
all right. She also testified that he showed her a book which contained a picture and explained the operation for the removal of the
bumps. This evidence was sufficient to warrant a jury instruction
on a special contract to cure.39
Any time a physician guarantees a result or suggests that complete success is an expectation, then a special contract may exist.
Neither the Schroeder nor Buskirk" opinions state that the physician admitted making the special contract. Therefore, the burden
of persuasion will depend upon introduction of corroborative evidence supporting the existence of the special contract. 1 The care-

3

Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W. Va. 159, 16 S.E. 564 (1892).
Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252, 12 S.E. 519 (1890).

Almost every malpractice case decided in West Virginia since Kuhn refers
to the higher standard of care when a special contract is proven. Only two cases
have actually involved a contract to cure. Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W. Va. 400, 141
S.E.2d 352 (1965); Buskirk v. Bucklew, 115 W. Va. 424, 176 S.E. 603 (1934). A
special contract imposes the highest standard of care since it does not allow for
failure or honest mistake. Any result less than absolute cure is actionable.
u Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W. Va. 400, 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965).
" Id. at 402-03, 141 S.E.2d at 357.
" Buskirk v. Bucklew, 115 W. Va. 424, 176 S.E. 603 (1934).
I The best source of corroborative evidence is the medical records. Medical
records in the typical case consist of the hospital record, office chart, and correspon-
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ful physician will outline the prognosis in the medical records so
that the existence or non-existence of a special contract will be
evident.
B.

Implied Contract

Medical-legal jurisprudence has traditionally rec'ognized that
the practice of medicine is not an exact science. For this reason,
the physician is expected to meet a standard of care based upon
time and place as established by expert testimony." The "locality
rule" regarding the standard of care is equally applicable to
"negligence" and "non-negligence based" actions.
Even though the physician and patient enter into an implied
contract, the standard of care is formulated in tort principles.
[T]he physician's duty to his patient is to exercise such skill
and diligence as are ordinarily exercised by average members in
good standing of the profession in a similar locality and in the
same general line of practice, regard being given to the state of
medical science at the time. 3
The "average" physician is the malpractice equivalent to the
"reasonably prudent man." No physician can be held
to a 100%
standard of correctness regarding his diagnosis and treatment.
Physicians do make mistakes which are not negligent or actiondence to referring physicians. In the hospital record, particular attention should be
directed to the admission summary, progress notes, physician orders, and discharge
summary. If a special contract exists, evidence of it should be found in these
records.
,2 The time and place factors are better known as the "locality rule." The
locality rule derived from a 19th Century view that it was unfair to hold a rural
medical practitioner to the same standard of care as the supposedly bettereducated physicians practicing in large urban centers. The rule has lost much of
its significance because of better medical education being available to all physicians and the establishment of medical specialties and national standards. Notwithstanding these significant changes, West Virginia still adheres to a liberalized
locality rule which states that a physician must exercise the reasonable and ordinary skill and diligence that is ordinarily exercised by the average members of the
profession in good standing in similar localities and in the same general line of
practice with regard being given to the state of medical science at the time. As will
be discussed infra, the locality rule has its most significant application when nonspecialist physicians are involved. Generally, a specialist will be held to a national
standard of care which would be exercised by ordinary and reasonable physicians
holding themselves out as a specialist in their particular medical field.
"Hinkle v. Martin, 256 S.E.2d 768, 770-71 (W. Va. 1979).
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able.' Even the combination of a mistake and a bad result does
not equal negligence unless the mistake "is so gross as to be inconsistent with that degree of skill which it is the duty of the physician
to possess.""
It is unrealistic to expect all physicians to achieve the highest
degree of care and skill. Our law is pragmatic enough not to expect
consistent high standards. This approach does substantial justice
for both the patient and the physician. A gross mistake or error
should be actionable, but public policy demands that honest mis47
takes not be the basis for a civil action.
C. Standard of Care For a Specialist
An exception to the "average" physician rule occurs
when the defendant doctor is a specialist. 8 In Hundley v.
"1 A mere mistake in judgment, diagnosis, or-treatment does not make a physician liable for injuries which result from the mistake. Jenkins v. Charleston Gen.
Hosp. & Training School, 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S.E. 560 (1922); Browning v. Hoffman,
86 W. Va. 468, 103 S.E. 484 (1920); Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. Va. 266, 53 S.E. 147 (1906).
Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. Va. 266, 273, 53 S.E. 147, 150 (1906).
4'In Dye, the court expressly recognized this rule.
We think it may be said to be the generally accepted doctrine that a
physician is not required to exercise the highest degree of skill and diligence possible, in the treatment of an injury or disease, unless he has by
special contract agreed to do.
Id. at 270, 53 S.E. at 149.
,1Judge (Chief Justice) Taft observed that few physicians could practice medicine if they would be held accountable for every error or mistake. Ewing v. Goode,
78 F. 442, 443 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1897). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
adopted this statement of public policy in Vaughan v. Memorial Hosp., 100 W. Va.
290, 294, 130 S.E. 481, 482 (1925). The following year the court stated: "It is a
matter of common knowledge that the wisest and most skillful practitioners in
medicine and surgery are often mistaken in diagnosis." Meadows v. McCullough,
101 W.Va. 103, 109, 132 S.E. 194, 197 (1926).
4 Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967). Dr. Martinez
was an ophthalmologist, a specialist in the treatment of diseases of the eye. The
court recognized that a specialist has taken advanced training which generally
includes a residency program of academic studies and clinical experiences. Many
specialists take and pass national examinations in their specialties. These physicians are then charged with observing a national standard of care which would be
higher than that expected of the "average" physician. Thus, Dr. Martinez was
charged with knowledge of the standard procedure for cataract operations throughout the United States.
A distinction may exist in some specialties where there is a "community national standard" and an "academic national standard." An example of this is
pathology where pathologists in a community hospital would not recognize a rare
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Martinez," Dr. Martinez had performed a cataract operation on
the plaintiff. Plaintiff charged the doctor with malpractice after it
was discovered that more than half of the iris of the left eye was
missing following the operation. Plaintiff's proof established that
Dr. Martinez's skill in this case did not meet the national standard
of care. This proof was offered at trial through the deposition of a
New York ophthalmalogist. The court permitted the New Yorker
to testify regarding the defendant's deviation from the standard of
care.
In rural communities, this exception will have little effect
since few specialists practice in these areas. The metropolitan
areas have many specialists and few general practitioners; thus,
the "specialist standard" should be more prevalent. However,
great care should be exercised by the trial judge in accepting proof
as to an alleged national standard from a professional witness who
travels from state to state peddling his services." This concern for
lesion, but a national center of pathology like the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology would identify the lesion. Even though the community pathologist passed a
national board examination, he should not be charged with the standard of care
established by a major research center.
41 151 W. Va. 977, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967).
10Plaintiffs lawyers have contended for years that a "conspiracy of silence"
exists, which imposes an impossible burden on the plaintiff to prove his case by
expert testimony. See Hundley v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 977, 992, 158 S.E.2d 159,
167-68 (1967). The Malpractice Commission was unable to find objective evidence
that any conspiracy exists. REPORT, supra note 3, at 36. Circumstantial evidence
does suggest that legitimate practicing physicians are reluctant to testify on one or
more of these bases:
(1) Reluctance to suffer loss of time and income for court appearances;
(2) Neglect of patients while away in court;
(3) Fear of cross examination by adverse attorney;
(4) Reluctance to injure friends or fellow physicians;
(5) Common belief among doctors that most malpractice cases are without merit.
REPORT, supra note 3, at 36-37.
As a result, expert witness procurement agencies have developed. One critic
has charged that some of the agencies are "flesh peddlers ... [whose] witnesses
are usually marginally competent." Windrew, The Midas of Medical Practice, 1
Am.LAw. 25, 27 (1979).
Some of these services allegedly permit the malpractice plaintiff to "expert
shop" until a willing witness is found. One attorney described his foray into the
expert marketplace in terms reminiscent of a housewife picking over fruit at the
vegetable counter. "The first [doctor] found no negligence. The second said there
was a problem, but he wasn't strong enough. The third one was good. I had to pay
fees for each one, for reviewing the file again." Id. at 28.
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legitimate testimony stems from the specter of filling courtrooms
with glib and polished "Madison Avenue" experts who are more
familiar with the gold standard than the standard of care.
D.

Standard of Care for Non-Medical Practitioners

Licensed physicians and surgeons are subject to the standards
of care described above. There are additional health care practitioners who appear to be in a standard of care limbo. Chiropodistpodiatrists,5" chiropractors," and optometrists" are not licensed
The objectivity of these hired guns has been questioned because of the contingency fee which the expert witness supplier earns. Id. at 26. It has been reported
that some injured plaintiffs have paid as much as 15% of their gross recovery to
the expert witness service. Id. In addition, these injured persons have reportedly
paid additional expert witness fees of $500 and up for an initial evaluation, $100
per hour for medical consultations or records review by the doctor, $150 per hour
to the doctor for deposition testimony, and between $1,000 and $1,500 per day, plus
expenses, for trial appearances. Id. at 28.
These payments create an unhealthy atmosphere in which the perversion of
justice is a distinct possibility.
Alternatives to this "expert at any price" system do exist. The Malpractice
Commission recommended the creation of expert witness pools. REPORT, supra note
3, at 37. Many state and county medical societies have responded by establishing
screening committees which guarantee an expert witness to any plaintiff presenting
a meritorious claim. New York city hospital physicians will evaluate cases and
testify in medical malpractice cases without any compensation. 65 A.B.A.J. 1042
(1979). Ohio, by statute, has set rigid qualifications for expert witnesses in malpractice cases. OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. 2743.43 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Among the requirements is that the physician spend 75% of his time in the active clinical practice of
medicine or university teaching.
11Chiropody-podiatry is the medical or surgical treatment of the ailments of
the human hand or foot with the use of local anesthetics. A chiropodist-podiatrist
may not amputate the foot, hand, toes, or fingers. W. VA. CODE § 30-11-2 (1976
Replacement Vol.). For representative chiropody malpractice cases, see: Pilger v.
City of Paris Dry Goods Co., 86 Cal. App. 277, 261 P. 328 (1927) (toe surgery);
Whyte v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 122 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 1960) (surgery,
neuroma, and medical sesamoid); Jones v. Stess, 111 N.J. Super. 283, 268 A.2d 292
(1970) (toe nail clipping complications).
11Chiropractic is the drugless treatment which attempts to cure through
"adjustment" and "manipulation" of the articulations and adjacent tissues of the
spinal column. W. VA. CODE § 30-16-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.). For representative
chiropractic malpractice cases, see: Salazar v. Ehmann, 505 P.2d 387 (Colo. App.
1972) (failure to diagnose fracture); Ison v. McFall, 400 S.W.2d 243 (Tenn. App.
1964) (paraplegia from spinal cord injury); Malmstrom v. Olsen, 16 Utah 2d 316,
400 P.2d 209 (1965) (ruptured disc, manipulation).
5 Optometry is the treatment of any abnormal condition of the human eye or
its appendages by any non-surgical method. Optometrists cannot prescribe injecta-
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physicians or surgeons.1
Limbo exists because only one case involving this class of
defendants has been decided. 5 In Schroeder, a chiropodist was
sued. An orthopedic surgeon and a chiropodist testified for the
plaintiff and two chiropodists testified on behalf of the defendant.
Both parties tried the case based upon the "ordinary skill and
diligence of the average chiropodist in this [Huntington] com'
The orthopedic surgeon testified that the surgery by Dr.
munity."56
Adkins caused the problem, but he did not testify as to a deviation
from the standard of care.
The opinion cites Dye v. Corbin as the standard of care benchmark.57 The court did not discuss the competency of a nonchiropodist to testify as to a chiropody standard of care." The
inference is clear that a chiropodist will be required only to perform
on the level of the average chiropodist, but not on the level of the
average medical doctor."9
IH.

THEORIES OF LLuiLiTY

Medical malpractice cases present the skillful practitioner
with myriad theories upon which recovery can be based. Breach
of the specialized duties owed by a physician to the patient can
be couched in both "negligent" and "non-negligent dependent"
causes of action.
The most frequently used theory is negligence-the failure by
the physician to use reasonable and ordinary care in the diagnosis
and treatment of the patient." Negligence can result from acts of
ble drugs. W. VA. CODE § 30-8-2 (1976 Replacement Vol.). For representative optometric malpractice cases, see Tempchin v. Sampson, 262 Md. 156, 277 A.2d 67
(1971) (misdiagnosis); Blanchard v. Michigan State Bd. of Examiners, 40 Mich.
App. 320, 198 N.W.2d 804 (1972) (failure to use ophthalmometer and retinoscope).
Medical Care, Inc. v. Chiropody Ass'n, 141 W. Va. 741, 93 S.E.2d 38 (1956).
Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W. Va. 400, 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965) (chiropodist).
" Id. at 406, 141 S.E. 2d at 355.
59 W. Va. 266, 53 S.E. 147 (1906), cited in 149 W. Va. at 406, 141 S.E. 2d at
355.
See Arshansky v. Royal Concourse Co., 28 App. Div. 2d 986, 283 N.Y.S.2d
646 (1967) (testimony by an orthopedist against chiropodist).
1' 149 W. Va. at 411, 141 S.E.2d at 358.
" See, e.g., Utter v. United Hosp. Center, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1977);
Frazier v. Grace Hosp., 117 W. Va. 330, 185 S.E. 415 (1936); Kuhn v. Brownfield,
34 W. Va. 252, 12 S.E. 519 (1890).
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commission6 ' as well as omissions.62
A. Negligence-Acts of Commission
The trial lawyer recognizes that it is very difficult to accurately evaluate a potential medical malpractice case during the
initial consultation.13 Many lawyers search endlessly for the blatant acts of commission such as removal of the wrong organ. Acts
of commission involve affirmative deviation from a standard of
care. A bad result does not necessarily mean that the physician
deviated from the standard of care. 4 This rule is necessary because
what may appear to be a bad result to a layman can be the expected and accepted medical treatment and healing process."
Result analysis can also be deceiving where the same outcome
would have occurred even in the absence of negligence. 6 More
West Virginia cases have involved acts of commission in the diagnosis and treatment of fractures than any other category of injury. 6
1, Moore v. Guthrie Hosp., Inc., 403 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1968); Maxwell v.
Howell, 114 W. Va. 771, 174 S.E. 553 (1934); Neil v. Flynn Lumber Co., 78 W. Va.
235, 88 S.E. 1090 (1916).
U1 Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Vaughn v. Memorial
Hosp., 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S.E. 481 (1925); Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568,
111 S.E. 492 (1922).
U C. KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 47 (4th ed. 1976); D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 8.01 (1977).

11Schroeder v. Adkins, 149 W. Va. 400, 141 S.E.2d 352 (1965); Buskirk v.
Bucklew, 115 W. Va. 424, 176 S.E. 603 (1934); Maxwell v. Howell, 114 W. Va. 771,
174 S.E. 553 (1934); Howell v. Biggart, 108 W. Va. 560, 152 S.E. 323 (1930);
Vaughan v. Memorial Hosp., 103 W. Va. 156, 136 S.E. 837 (1927); Vaughan v.
Memorial Hosp., 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S.E. 481 (1925).
U Hinkle v. Martin, 256 S.E.2d 768 (W. Va. 1979). Here, plaintiff was undergoing x-ray treatment for the excision of warts. She complained that following the
third x-ray treatment that she had pain, bleeding, and a generally deteriorated
condition of her hand. This was exactly the expected skin reaction that was explained to Mrs. Hinkle by Dr. Martin. Thus, the Supreme Court of Appeals, affirmed the directed verdict by the trial judge.
asA medical malpractice case will fail if the plaintiff cannot establish a proximate cause relationship between the alleged wrongful conduct and the "bad" result. Garzione v. Vassar Bros. Hosp., 36 App. Div. 2d 390, 320 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1971),
affl'd, 30 N.Y.2d 857, 286 N.E.2d 731, 335 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1972) (leg amputation jury
award of $150,000 reduced to $1).
1 Utter v. United Hosp. Center, 236 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1977) (arm); Thornton
v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 213 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1975) (leg); Makarenko
v. Scott, 132 W. Va. 430, 55 S.E.2d 88 (1949) (forearm); Frazier v. Grace Hosp.,
117 W. Va. 330, 185 S.E. 415 (1936) (hip); Conley v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 175, 174 S.E.
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Typically, these cases involved improper casting which resulted in
amputations, deformities, and other complications. For example,
in Utter,6 8 plaintiff was admitted to the hospital with a comminuted compound fracture of the right wrist, a posterior dislocation
of the right elbow, and a compression fracture of the second lumbar
vertebra. After two days in the hospital, the injured arm was black,
swollen, edematous, and exuding a foul smelling drainage. Both
the orthopedic surgeon and the hospital were found negligent in
the treatment of this arm which was eventually amputated.
Our court has been very protective of patients who are injured
by or through the administration of medicine or drugs." Adverse
drug reactions or complications should not make the physician
strictly liable since the physician is neither a manufacturer nor a
retailer. 0 The complexity and sophistication of prescription drug
selection negates the usefulness of strict liability. The foreseeability of adverse reactions to the drug is difficult to predict. Recovery
must be based upon a showing by expert testimony that the prescription did not meet the standard of care."
883 (1934) (leg); Mier v. Yoho, 114 W. Va. 248, 171 S.E. 535 (1933) (leg); Vaughan
v. Memorial Hosp., 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S.E. 481 (1925) (foot); Jenkins v. Charleston Gen. Hosp. & Training School, 90 W. Va. 230, 110 S.E. 560 (1922) (arm);
Browning v. Hoffman, 86 W. Va. 468, 103 S.E. 484 (1920) (leg); Neil v. Flynn
Lumber Co., 78 W. Va. 235, 88 S.E. 1090 (1916) (leg); Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. Va.
266, 53 S.E. 147 (1906) (ankle).
" 236 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1977).
" Howell v. Biggart, 108 W. Va. 560, 152 S.E. 323 (1930); Young v. Jordan,
106 W. Va. 139, 145 S.E. 41 (1928).
10Strict liability for defective products was recently adopted. Morningstar v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 680 (W. Va. 1979). In New Jersey, the
court held that strict liability was not applicable to a dentist's professional service
involving a defective product. Plaintiff was required to prove negligence. Magrine
v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968).
1,No expert was required by the court in Howell since the principal theory of
recovery was abandonment rather than negligence. The physician must consider
both intrinsic and extrinsic factors when selecting prescription medicines.
Not all reactions seemingly due to hypersensitivity are caused by factors
intrinsic to the patient however. Dosage (by any route of administration),
speed of injection, and site of injection can 6trongly influence the degree
of unfavorable reaction manifested by a patient to a drug.
Harmful effects of drugs can also be due to errors in prescriptions, failure
clearly to explain ...

side effects or alternatives ... choice of the wrong

drug ... and accidental ingestion or overdosage. (footnotes omitted).
D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 4.11 (1977).
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B.

Negligence by Omission

The classic case of negligent omission involved the woman
who engaged the physician to sterilize her. Following the sterilization operation, she became pregnant.72 She sued the doctor by
alleging that he was negligent in failing to perform as requested.
A physician may be liable for failing to diagnose a condition
promptly or properly. 3 Like acts of commission, malpractice by
omission must be proven by expert testimony rather than lay conjecture.74 A plaintiff cannot prevent the physician from treating the
condition and later charge the physician with malpractice for his
failure to act. 5
Cases based on negligent omissions can arise when a physician
fails to understand his limitations. 6 Lack of communication and
candor between physician and patient can also create legal liability. 77 The safest course for a physician is to fully inform the patient
and seek consultations with specialists where reasonable diagnostic doubt exists.
72

Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967).

71Robinson v. Amick, 125 W. Va. 392, 24 S.E.2d 461 (1943); Frazier v. Grace

Hosp., 117 W. Va. 330, 185 S.E. 415 (1935); Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568,
111 S.E. 492 (1922); Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. Va. 266, 53 S.E. 147 (1906).
74Id.

75Meadows v. McCullough, 101 W. Va. 103, 132 S.E. 194 (1926). A father
removed his son from the defendant hospital and went to a second hospital where
the son's bladder was catheterized. There was no expert testimony that such treatment should have been administered before the son's removal and, therefore, no
malpractice.
76 The AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS §8 provides: "A physician should seek consultation upon request, in doubtful and difficult
cases, or whenever it appears that the quality of medical service may be enhanced
thereby."
If a non-specialist physician undertakes treatment in a field of medicine that
requires specialized care and diagnosis, he is inviting trouble. If the treatment
adopted will be of no benefit, the physician must inform the patient. Benson v.
Dean, 232 N.Y. 52, 133 N.E. 125 (1921). The patient has the right to expect advice
as to which other physicians are necessary and properly qualified to assist in the
treatment. Batty v. Arizona State Dental Bd., 57 Ariz. 239, 254, 112 P.2d 870, 877
(1941); Manion v. Tweedy, 257 Minn. 59, 100 N.W.2d 124 (1959). See Cobbs v.
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Hagman, The Medical
Patient'sRight to Know: Report on a Medical-Legal-Ethical,EmpiricalStudy, 17
U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 758, 815 (1970).
n The failure to inform the patient of his condition and obtain consent for
diagnostic tests or surgical procedures will be discussed infra. This theory of liability is known as informed consent.
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C. Res Ipsa Loquitur

Literally translated, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing itself
speaks." When applicable in West Virginia, this method of proving
liability creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence.78
Three criterion must be simultaneously present before the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will apply in West Virginia: (1) the
instrumentality which caused the injuries must have been under
the exclusive control of the defendant; (2) the injury must be one
which would not occur ordinarily in the absence of negligence; (3)
the plaintiff must be totally without fault."
Tangible products, automobiles, electricity, and other such
commodities are capable of being controlled exclusively. Experience permits informed judgments as to whether or not negligence
involving such instrumentalities would occur in the ordinary
course of events. This is not the situation with medical malpractice
cases. The human body remains a mystery despite centuries of
study. The success or failure of any medical treatment requires
precise analysis of the individual patient's present condition, medical history, and responsiveness to available remedies. The same
disease in two patients will often require different treatments.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying West Virginia law,
have rejected, without exception, the use of res ipsa loquitur in
medical malpractice cases.8" This is an appropriate position for our
court to maintain because of the basic unfairness of permitting a
plaintiff to show what appears to be an injury and letting that
" Res ipsa loquitur is not proof of negligence itself, but it furnishes a rebuttable
presumption of negligence sufficient to permit the jury to find negligence unless the
presumption is rebutted by the defendant. See: Walton v. Given, 215 S.E.2d 647,
651 (W. Va. 1975); Sutton v. Monongahela Power Co., 151 W. Va. 961, 158 S.E.2d
98 (1967); Mullins v. Baker, 144 W. Va. 92, 107 S.E.2d 57 (1959); Mecum v. Food
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 143 W. Va. 627, 103 S.E.2d 897 (Q958); Laurent v. United
Fuel Gas Co., 101 W. Va. 499, 133 S.E. 116 (1926).
7' Walton v. Given, 215 S.E.2d 647, 651 (W. Va. 1975).
' Moore v. Guthrie Hosp., Inc., 403 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1968); Vaughan v.
Memorial Hosp., 103 W. Va. 156, 136 S.E. 837 (1927); Vaughan v. Memorial Hosp.,
100 W. Va. 290, 130 S.E. 481 (1925). See also Willigerod v. Sharafabadi, 161 W.
Va. 995, 158 S.E.2d 175 (1967). For a cursory discussion examining the law of West
Virginia regarding res ipsa loquitur and how it might apply to medical malpractice
cases, see 70 W. VA. L. Rxv. 471 (1968). The student author advocates a refinement
of the res ipsa loquiturdoctrine in West Virginia to permit its use in those instances
where a physician leaves a foreign object inside the patient's body.
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injury create a rebuttable presumption of negligence. As noted
earlier, a bad result received in the course of medical treatment
does not equal negligence. 8' The potential prejudice to the defendant physician which is certain to follow the use of res ipsa in
malpractice cases has been expressly noted and criticized by the
2
Medical Malpractice Commission and commentators.
For a variety of reasons, and principally because of the alleged
conspiracy of silence, res ipsa loquiturhas become an increasingly
important evidentiary device to plaintiffs' attorneys. During the
period 1961-1971, 13.4% of all appellate malpractice cases involved
res ipsa loquitur as an issue.81 Prior to 1950, only 6.3% of the appellate malpractice cases involved this doctrine.84
There is no breakdown available from the Medical Malpractice Commission as to how many of these cases involved foreign
objects left in the body. At first blush, it would seem difficult to
dispute the applicability of res ispa to foreign object cases. The
three criteria would seem satisfied since the physician presumably
has exclusive control of the foreign object; the plaintiff certainly
would not be at fault in permitting the object to remain in his
body; and the injury would not occur but for the carelessness of the
physician and/or hospital staff in failing to do an accurate instrument count or sponge count. However, as a practical matter, the
surgeon relies upon the surgical nurse to do the sponge count and
the instrument nurse to do the instrument count. The exclusivity
of control might not be vested in one person. There are five reported foreign object cases in West Virginia, three of which involved sponges."
a See note 64, supra.
REPORT, supra note 3, at 28-29. The commission expressed great concern over
the expansion of the doctrine particularly in the state of California. This expansion
has taken place by permitting the doctrine to apply to rare medical accident cases.
Compare Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955) and Cavero v. Franklin Gen. Benevolent Soc., 36 Cal. 2d 301, 223 P.2d 471 (1950) with Lambert v. Soltis,
422 Pa. 304, 221 A.2d 173 (1966) and Hale v. Heninger, 97 Idaho 414, 393 P.2d 718
(1964). This expansion is deplorable and was expressly rejected by the Medical
Malpractice Commission. Other commentators have also strongly criticized the use
of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice cases. See, e.g., Adamson, Medical
Malpractice-Misuseof Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 MINN. L. Rlv. 1043 (1962); Binder,
Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice, 17 CLv.-MAR. L. RFv. 218 (1968); Hanson & Stromberg, HospitalLiability for Negligence, 21 HAST. L.J. 1 (1969).
m REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
4 Id.
I

Pickett v. Aglinsky, 110 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1940) (sponge); Hill v. Clarke, 241
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Foreign object cases are susceptible to res ipsa usage if the
lawyer prepares his case sufficiently to answer the "exclusivity of
control" issue.
D. Abandonment
Among the non-negligence related bases of liability, abandonment is the easiest to prove for the malpractice victim. The most
frequent fact pattern involves a case where a physician begins to
treat a patient's disease and then leaves the commpunity or the
hospital at a time when the patient requires additional care.
The duty prescribed by law is that the doctor, after being
employed, must treat the sickness or medical condition for its
duration and that the physician-patient relationship continues
unless it is terminated by mutual consent, or revoked by the express discharge of the physician by the patient or notice by the
physician to the patient of his intention to discontinue treatment,
without prejudice to the patient. Reasonable and ordinary care
must be used in making the decision regarding the intention to
discontinue treatment so that a replacement physician can be secured or other arrangements made."
The grossest abandonment case in West Virginia jurisprudence is Howell v. Biggart.Y1 Mrs. Howell was informed by Dr. Biggart that she was in a rundown condition after a miscarriage and
that she needed a tonic. The tonic was administered every other
day for a period of approximately four weeks. This tonic was given
intravenously in increasing quantities as the treatment progressed.
The doctor encouraged the patient to "endure the spartan treatment" despite the fact that she was obviously ill with intermittent
fever, chilling, vomiting, and a rash. In addition, her finger and toe
nails fell off and her body was raw for several days as if she suffered
from a severe burn. In the midst of all this, Dr. Biggart left the
community without any notice to Mrs. Howell. The outrage of the
West Virginia Court at this conduct is manifested by the fact that
it did not require the use of expert testimony to present a case for
the jury. Two other West Virginia cases regarding abandonment
S.E.2d 572 (W. Va. 1978) (needle); Morgan v. Grace Hosp. Inc., 149 W. Va. 783,
144 S.E.2d 156 (1965) (sponge); Gray v. Wright, 142 W. Va. 490, 96 S.E.2d 671
(1957) (hemostat); Baker v. Hendrix, 126 W.Va. 37, 27 S.E.2d 275 (1943) (sponge).
u Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W. Va. 159, 16 S.E. 564 (1892).
108 W. Va. 560, 152 S.E. 323 (1930).
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present equally stark fact patterns."
It is not a defense for a doctor to be unavailable to his patient
because he is treating other patients." Moreover, the availability
of other physicians to take care of a patient will not relieve the
defendant doctor of liability for abandonment unless he made prior
arrangements for such substitute care and informed the patient of
the identity of the substitute."
Liability based upon abandonment still requires that the
plaintiff sustain his burden of proof by showing that the injury was
proximately caused by the absence of the physician at the time
and place in question. This includes the necessity of expert testimony on the issue of causation. In Browning v. Hoffman,9 liability
based upon abandonment was rejected by the court because of the
absence of proof that the physician's presence would have changed
the result and by proof that the physician left a competent assistant monitoring the patient's care as well as adequate instructions
for the nursing staff on duty. Thus, while abandonment is easier
to prove than many other malpractice theories, it is still tightly
monitored by the proximate cause requirement.
The court obviously understands the realities of medical practice; one physician cannot be available at all times to all of his
patients. Group practice and coverage arrangements are common
among all practicing physicians. In essence, the duty of care owed
by the original physician can be delegated so long as the substitute
physician is competent and has adequate information to treat the
patient in the event of an emergency. This duty can also be delegated to a nursing staff for short periods of time when competent
physicians are available for consultation.
13Young v. Jordan, 106 W. Va. 139, 145 S.E. 41 (1928). In Young, the court
held that once an obstetrician gives a pregnant woman drugs to induce labor, he
has an absolute duty to stay with her until delivery is accomplished. See also
Buskirk v. Bucklew, 115 W. Va. 424, 176 S.E. 603 (1934). This case mixes the
theories of special contract, abandonment, and gross negligence in the use of x-ray
therapy. Following severe burns of the arm, the doctor advised her not to return
for additional treatment or care since he was going to Baltimore. She was compelled

to seek other medical care.
0 This broad statement is made in Young v. Jordan, 106 W. Va. 139, 145 S.E.
41 (1928) in the context of an impending pregnancy. It is doubtful that this would
be an absolute rule.
0 Howell v. Biggart,

108 W. Va. 560, 152 S.E. 323 (1930).

,1 90 W. Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922).
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In Maxwell v. Howell,"2 the court recognized that temporary
abandonment or neglect can constitute a deviation from the standard of care and can be actionable. In that case, there was proof
that the operating surgeon neglected to visit the patient postoperatively for as many as five days at one time and eight days at
another. The court required expert testimony that the failure of the
doctor to visit the patient deviated from the standard of care and
proximately resulted in harm to the patient.
Maxwell is the most recent of the abandonment cases decided
in West Virginia and reinforces the view that abandonment must
be proved by expert testimony. The court implicitly recognizes a
sliding scale of responsibility from the physician to the patient
depending upon the physical condition of the patient and the
length of the absence.
E.

Informed Consent

The most fundamental right of every person in this society is
that of determining what shall be done with his body. The common
law and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
have afforded protection to the individual's right of selfdetermination regarding his body.
Surgery has always been recognized as an accepted and necessary medical procedure. Surgery necessarily involves intervention
of the body cavity. Thus, the common law has developed a doctrine
known as informed consent which requires that a physician obtain
the consent of the patient prior to any disturbance of the physical
security and integrity of the body. West Virginia recognizes this
principle."
In Browning 1,11 the language of the court is dictum since
there was no informed consent issue raised. However, the strength
of the court's pronouncement on informed consent would indicate
that West Virginia is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions.
"Except in very extreme cases, a surgeon has no legal right to
operate upon a patient without his consent, nor upon a child without the consent of its parent or guardian.""
114 W. Va. 771, 174 S.E. 553 (1934).
Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922); Browning v.
Hoffman, 86 W. Va. 468, 103 S.E. 484 (1920).
' 90 W. Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922).
's Id. at 581, 111 S.E. at 497.
32

'9
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The emergency exception carved out in Browning H is necessary and consistent with good medical practice. In those circumstances where the patient is unable to give consent and delay will
cause irreversible consequences, the physician must be permitted
to act without fear of reprisal."
One of the critical issues in most informed consent cases involves the scope of the disclosure rather than the absence of consent." Most courts have been hesitant to set specific disclosure
requirements and have opted instead for a balancing test since all
medical procedures have an inherent risk of failure."8 Each proce,1 Jackovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931) (plaintiff, a minor,
was injured as a result of a fall from a freight train; defendant physician amputated
his arm without parental consent after unsuccessful efforts were made to locate the
parents for the purpose of obtaining consent); Wells v. McGehee, 39 So. 2d 196 (La.
App. 1949) (plaintiff, a minor, sustained a wrist fracture and was taken to defendant's medical office for treatment; she was anesthetized with chloroform and
death ensued within five minutes; search for parents to obtain consent was described as half-hearted; defendant was held not liable on the grounds of emergency).
'1 Louisell and Williams suggest that comprehensive informed consent, where
circumstances permit, should include the following: "(1) the diagnosis, (2) the
general nature of the contemplated procedure, (3) the risks involved, (4) the prospects of success, (5) the prognosis if the procedure is not performed and (6) alternative methods of treatment, if any." D. Lou sELL & H. WLLAMS, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 22.01 (1977).

11For example, a balanced approach was originally adopted by a California
District Court of Appeal in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ. Bd. of Trustees,
154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957):
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an
intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise the
physician may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure or operation in order to induce his patient's consent. At the same time, the physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else and this very fact
places him in a position in which he sometimes must choose between two
alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the patient every risk

attendant upon any surgical procedure or operation, no matter how remote; this may well result in alarming a patient who is already unduly
apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to undertake surgery in
which there is in fact a minimal risk; it may also result in actually
increasing the risks by reason of the physiological results of the apprehension itself. The other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate
problem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition is important
and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element
of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with
the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent.
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dure is unique to the extent that the risk of failure or adverse result
fluctuates, depending on the physical condition of the patient.
The consent obtained is only as effective as the ability of the
physician to establish that it was actually "informed." The physician's explanation of the procedure must be in such words and
phrases that the patient can intellectually grasp what is being said.
For example, a patient who signed a consent for the perfornance
of a mastectomy, but did not understand that this meant removal
of her breast, successfully asserted a claim for lack of informed
consent.99
Liability arising from a surgical procedure where informed
consent is missing presents the plaintiff with one of two available
theories of recovery: battery or negligence.'
Even though informed consent is a non-negligence based
theory of recovery, the plaintiff must sustain his burden of proof
that the injury proximately resulted from the failure of the physician to inform the patient properly and obtain consent for the
medical procedure. There is a subjective decision that a patient
must make regarding whether or not to undergo a particular medical procedure. However, it would be patently unfair to permit an
obviously disgruntled patient to sustain his burden of proof on
informed consent by merely testifying that he would not have undergone the treatment had he been advised of all the risks. The
patient's testimony can certainly be considered by the jury, but it
is never conclusive.
California has abandoned this balanced approach for the ultra-liberal patientfocused standard which requires disclosure of all risks which would be material to
the patient's decision.
Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955).
10 Battery is appropriate where a physician obtains no consent or obtains a
consent for the performance of a particular procedure but performs a different

procedure for which consent was not obtained. See, e.g., Zoterell v. Repp, 187 Mich.

319, 153 N.W. 692 (1915) (consent for a hernia operation but physician also removed
both ovaries); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905) (consent for
operation on right ear and physician operated on the left ear); Darrab v. Kite, 32
App. Div. 2d 208, 301 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1969) (consent for routine brain test and a

complete workup but no consent for a ventriculogram which necessitated the drill-

ing of holes in the head of a nine year old child).
Negligence is the appropriate theory when injury results due to an undisclosed
risk inherent in the procedure. See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ. Bd.
of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (1957) (paralysis of lower extreme.
ties following an aortographic examination); Aiken v. Clary, 396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo.
1965) (brain damage following insulin shock therapy).
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For that reason, proof of the standard of care regarding the
extent of disclosure necessary to "inform" can be accomplished
three ways. The first system, and the one probably applicable in
West Virginia, establishes the duty of the physician by the ordinary and reasonable disclosure practices of the average physician
practicing in the same field in the same or similar communities.'"'
The plaintiff must establish both the customary disclosure practices and the physician's deviation by the use of expert testimony.
The second system discards the locality rule in favor of measuring the standard of care by what a reasonable physician would
disclose under the same or similar circumstances.' 2 This system
would substitute a national standard of reasonable and ordinary
care for the traditional locality standard.
-The third approach focuses upon the patient's state of mind
rather than the mind of the physician. This system holds that the
duty of the physician will be measured by the patient's need for
information which is material to the patient's decision whether or
not to accept or reject the proposed treatment. 0 3 This minority
approach developed because of a dissatisfaction with granting unlimited discretion to physicians as to what information to disclose.
,0ISee, e.g., Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 534 P.2d 1052 (1975); Wagner
v. Olmedo, 365 A.2d 643 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976); Marchlewicz v. Stanton, 50 Mich.
App. 344, 213 N.W.2d 317 (1973); Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d
571 (1975); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976). A variation of this
requirement holds that disclosures are required unless nondisclosure is shown to
conform with community medical standards of care or national standards, if applicable. See Martin v. Bralliar, 36 Colo. App. 254, 540 P.2d 1118 (1975).
,"I See, e.g., Thomas v. Berrios, 348 So. 2d 905 (Fla. App. 1977); Charley v.
Cameron, 215 Kan. 750, 528 P.2d 1205 (1974); Kaplan v. Haines, 96 N.J. Super.
242, 232 A.2d 840 (1967), aff'd, 51 N.J. 404, 241 A.2d 235 (1968); Wilson v. Scott,
412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967).
"I See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1972); Parker v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 335 So. 2d 725, cert. denied, 338
So. 2d 700 (La. App. 1976); Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 66 Ohio Ops.
2d 295, 308 N.E.2d 765 (1973); Jeffries v. McCague, 242 Pa. Super. 76, 363 A.2d
1167 (1976); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Longmire v.
Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. App. 1974) (by implication); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 349 A.2d 703 (1975); Archer v. Galbraith, 18 Wash. App.
369, 567 P.2d 1155 (1977); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1,
227 N.W.2d 647 (1975). The most discussed among these cases is Canterbury v.
Spence. It has been persuasively argued that Haven v. Randolph, 342 F. Supp. 538,
(1972) aff'd, 494 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974) overruled Canterbury sub silentio.
Laskey, Canterburyv. Spence-Informed Consent Revisited, 11 FoRum 713 (1976).
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As many as ten exceptions or defenses are available to the
requirement of informed consent. These defenses include "but for
situations,"''0 "unexpected risks,''105 "ignorance is bliss,"'' 8
"emergencies,"' 0 7 "peace of mind,"'' 0 "commonly known dangers,"' 9 "discovered dangers,""' 0 "non-material dangers,""'
"improper performance of a proper procedure, ' and "extreme
' 3
rarity of a non-serious risk."
West Virginia's development of the law of informed consent
should follow our traditional formula of evaluating the physician's
disclosure requirement by the standards of his community or a
similar community.
F.

Vicarious,Liability

A physician is liable for injuries proximately caused by his
negligence and the negligence of his partners and employees.I" The
Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1965).
Campbell v. Thornton, 368 Mass. 528, 333 N.E.2d 442 (1975); Block v.
McVay, 80 S.D. 469, 126 N.W.2d 808 (1964).
206 Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1970)
(where a patient advises the physician that he would rather remain ignorant of the
implications of the contemplated procedure, he cannot later complain that he failed
to give informed consent).
i Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406, 432 P.2d 250 (1967).
'
Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Ala. 1962) (where a patient's peace
of mind requires less than a full disclosure of possible risks, it is permissible for the
physician to withhold full disclosure); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d
116 (1970).
10 Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975) (the physician
has no obligation to communicate commonly known dangers such as infection when
the patient is of average sophistication and should be aware of the risks).
20,

205

110Id.

IId.
m Mallett v. Pirkey, 171 Colo. 271, 466 P.2d 466 (1970) (the physician does not
have a duty to disclose the risks of his negligence in performing the medical procedure for which consent has been obtained).
113 Sawyer v. Methodist Hosp., 383 F. Supp. 563 (W.D. Tenn. 1974); Longmire
v. Hoey, 512 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. App. 1974).
"I West Virginia has adopted the Uniform Partnership Act which provides:
Where, by any wrongful act or omissions of any partner acting in the
ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority
of its co-partners, loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a
partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is
liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting the
act.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss2/4

26

Farrell: The Law of Medical Malpractice in West Virginia
19791

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

context of vicarious liability usually arises where numerous physicians and/or hospital personnel have been involved in the diagnostic or treatment phase of the patient's care. Most plaintiff's attorneys choose to file "shotgun" actions which name every doctor or
hospital that has been involved in the case and effectively shift the
pre-trial burden to each defendant to prove that he is not responsible for the alleged negligence. This "weeding out" of defendants
usually involves substantial discovery.
Recently, physicians have begun to engage in non-traditional
business forms of medical practice. For example, partnerships are
not being formed as readily as they were in the past since the
present trend favors office-sharing arrangements or medical clinics. In either situation, an individual physician will rent office
space and maintain his own patients but share in the common
expense of communal services such as reception, secretarial, accounting, and administration." 5 These arrangements should not
form any legal basis for suit against a non-treating physician who
happens to also practice in the medical office or clinic.
Some debate exists in the trial courts of West Virginia regard'
ing the scope and effect of the Medical Corporation Act." Prior to
W. VA. CODE § 47-8A 13 (1976 Replacement Vol.). It is axiomatic that a physician
would be liable for the torts of his employee based on agency principles.
"I See Graddy v. New York Medical College, 19 App. Div. 2d 426, 243
N.Y.S.2d 940 (1963). In this case, a patient came into the care of Dr. Edward Bell,
an otolaryngologist, who shared one medical office complete with secretary, professional equipment, and office supplies with a second physician, Dr. Alvin M. Street.
The plaintiff was originally the patient of Dr. Street but came under the care of
Dr. Bell exclusively prior to the alleged negligence. Graddy sued both doctors. Dr.
Street was held vicariously liable at trial. The appellate court reversed, holding that
where there is neither legal nor actual control of the treating physician by another
physician, the mere relationship of sharing office space or an agreement to service

each others' patients will not create vicarious liability.

W. VA. CODE § 30-3-4c (1976 Replacement Vol.) provides in relevant part:
A medical corporation may practice medicine and surgery only through

"'

individual physicians and surgeons duly licensed to practice medicine or
surgery in the State of West Virginia, but such physicians and surgeons

may be employees rather than shareholders of such corporation, and
nothing herein contained shall be construed to require a license for or
other legal authorization of any individual employed by such corporation
to perform services for which no license or other legal authorization is
otherwise required. Nothing contained in this article is meant or intended
to change in any way the rights, duties, privileges, responsibilities and
liabilities incident to the physician-patient relationship nor is it meant
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its enactment, the law was clear that a non-treating physician
could be held vicariously liable only if he was in a legal partnership
subject to the Uniform Partnership Act.' It would seem equally
consistent that the Medical Corporation Act would insulate a physician who is merely a shareholder or employee of a medical corporation from vicarious liability when he did not personally treat or
otherwise affect the health care rendered to that patient. The language of the statute is consistent with this interpretation.
West Virginia has never adopted the "Captain of the Ship"
doctrine which holds an operating surgeon liable for the negligence
of all participants in the surgical arena. "' The Captain of the Ship
doctrine is basically unfair in its attempt to make the physician
the watchdog of persons beyond his control. For example, a physician normally does not control the work of the anesthesiologist or
anesthetist in the surgical procedure. However, in West Virginia,
a modified Captain of the Ship doctrine may exist when an anesthetist is administering anesthesia and the surgeon is the only
medical doctor present."'
or intended to change in any way the personal character of the physicianpatient relationship.
W. VA. CODE § 47-8A-1 to -45 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
"
Rockwell v. Stone, 404 Pa. 561, 173 A.2d 48 (1961).
"' An anesthesiologist is a medical doctor who is generally certified by a national examination as a specialist in the administration and treatment of
anesthesia-related cases. An anesthetist is a nurse who has received specialized
training and is licensed by the State of West Virginia as an anesthetist.
In the four or five largest cities in West Virginia, there is a shortgage of anesthesiologists. Thus, nurse anesthetists are employed to administer the anesthesia. The
nurse anesthetists are the ones actually in surgery and the anesthesiologists are
generally on call at the hospital in case of emergency. In these circumstances, the
anesthetist theoretically is subject to the control of the operating surgeon and the
operating surgeon may be responsible for the negligence of the anesthetist. W. VA.
CODE § 30-7-15 (1976 Replacement Vol.) provides:
In any case where it is lawful for a duly licensed physician or dentist
practicing medicine or dentistry under the laws of this State to administer anesthetics, such anesthetics may lawfully be given and administered
by any person (a) who has been licensed to practice registered professional nursing under this article, and (b) who holds a diploma or certificate evidencing his or her successful completion of the educational program of a school of anesthesia duly accredited by the American association of nurse anesthetists: Provided, that such anesthesia is administered
by such person in the presence and under the supervision of such physician or dentist.
In most rural West Virginia hospitals, no anesthesiologist is available. The
operating surgeon will be responsible for supervising the anesthetist.
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An additional vicarious liability situation exists in West Virginia. Hospitals are vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of
their agents, servants, or employees.'20 For many years, our court
created a legal fiction to avoid charitable immunity which permitted liability only upon a showing that the charitable hospital negligently employed incompetent persons." '
The law of vicarious liability is very broad. West Virginia's
exposure to this doctrine has been limited in medical malpractice
cases. The public policy reasons for spreading the risk among as
many financially responsible individuals as possible are appropriate when the individuals charged have the capability of preventing
the negligence. However, West Virginia should be very cautious in
extending vicarious liability too far. For example, the adoption of
a rule which makes a hospital vicariously liable for the torts of the
independent contractor physicians utilizing the hospital would be
destructive to the health care system. 2 '
IV.

DEFENSES

Medical malpractice cases are not exempt from the standard
common law defenses available in any negligence action. With the
adoption of comparative negligence, a plaintiff cannot recover if
his negligence is equal to or greater than the combined negligence
of the defendants.'1
A.

Contributory Negligence

Contributory negligence has always been a defense in medical
malpractice cases.'2 4 However, the court has confused the concept
110See, e.g., Utter v. United Hosp. Center, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1977)
Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc., 149 W. Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d 754 (1965); Hogan
v. Clarksburg Hosp. Co., 63 W. Va. 84, 59 S.E. 943 (1907).
M'The first case discussing this legal fiction was Roberts v. Ohio Valley Gen.
Hosp., 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925). Legal fiction may be a harsh description,
but it certainly seems that our court imposed it as a pretext so that charitable
hospitals would not be absolutely immune. Of course, charitable immunity has
been abolished. Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp., 149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965).
122The historic case of Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33
Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965) held that a hospital has a duty to supervise the
physicians who practice therein. A few jurisdictions have followed the lead of
Darling,but most have wisely rejected its thesis as unworkable and unrealistic.
1" Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
121 Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W. Va. 159, 16 S.E. 564 (1892).
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negligence with the concept of mitigation of damof contributory
z
ages.' 2
The nature of medical malpractice cases generally precludes
actual contributory negligence by the plaintiff since the patient is
generally being acted upon by the physician. Subsequent conduct
which should reduce any award to a plaintiff would include failure
to continue prescribed treatment, failure to take prescribed drugs,
or failure to submit to corrective procedures designed to undo the
original malpractice.'26
B. Assumption of Risk
The West Virginia Court has not addressed assumption of risk
in a medical malpractice situation. Examples of the application of
the doctrine include situations where the plaintiff knew that the
physician was incompetent or that the course of treatment de,2 Jenkins v. Charleston Gen. Hosp. & Training School, 90 W. Va. 230, 110
S.E. 560 (1922). In that case, the court stated:
Manifestly the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, as matter
of law, but not until after the negligence of the defendant had inflicted
some injury upon him. The original negligence, committed within the
period of employment continuing until the plaintiff's negligence occurred, was the detriment suffered between the dates of the two acts of
negligence. In other words, the proximate cause of the injury complained
of was nontreatment. In the first instance non-treatment was imputable
to the defendant alone and later, to both it and the defendant ...
No effort was made in the course of the trial to apply the legal
principle requiring apportionment or limitation of damages in conformity
with the bases of liability, as here defined. In attempting to prove his case
the plaintiff imputed all of the injury and damages to the defendant,
notwithstanding the obvious lack of right to recover for so much of the
damages as were occasioned by the combined negligence of both, if apportionment thereof by the jury was possible. Nor was the attention of the
jury directed to their power and duty to make the apportionment, if
practicable, and limit their verdict to the damages accrued before the
date of the plaintiff's contribution to the negligence of the defendant. If
a proper inquiry had been made, it might had been shown that the effect
of the defendant's negligence was slight and of little consequence, and
that substantially all of the injury complained of was the result of the
concurrent negligence.
Id. at 243-44, 110 S.E. at 565-66.
"I Thackery v. Helfrich, 123 Ohio St. 334, 175 N.E. 449 (1931) (plaintiff refused to submit to corrective surgery designed to remedy a faulty union of bone
fragments following the original negligent treatment).
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viated from the standard of care and, notwithstanding this knowledge, plaintiff continued in the care of the physician.'2
C. Emergencies
The only other substantive defense is emergency. West Virginia has implicitly recognized this defense by dictum in Fosterv.
Memorial Hospital Association of Charleston.' West Virginia
would, in the appropriate case, certainly embrace the concept of
emergency as a complete defense to a claim of no informed consent.
D. Statute of Limitations
Medical malpractice cases have reshaped the heretofore clear
and unambiguous language of West Virginia's statute of limitations.'2 Prior to 1965, the Supreme Court of Appeals had held that
the statute of limitations began to run in a medical malpractice
case at the time of the alleged negligence "in the absence of actual
knowledge, fraud, or concealment on the part of the defendant.""'
Moreover, the physician's silence was held not to constitute fraud
which would toll the running of the statute. 3 '
However, these cases have been expressly overruled by
"1 See, e.g., Champs v. Stone, 74 Ohio App. 344,58 N.E.2d 803 (1944); Gramm
v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497 (1877); Kirschner v. Keller, 70 Ohio App. 111, 42 N.E.2d 463

(1942).
'-219 S.E.2d 916, 921 (W. Va. 1975). In discussing an emergency situation
regarding blood donors and blood supply, the court suggested that the standard of
care will be adjusted in an emergency situation.
Obviously under circumstances such as this the degree of "reasonable
care" necessary to protect the hospital from liability must be lower than
in other circumstances because the exigencies of the situation demand
speed, and the time necessary for the performance of tests is not available. Otherwise the hospital leaves the healing business and enters the
insurance business.
Similarly, while the giving of inherently dangerous experimental
drugs may be 'reasonable' in a 'last-ditch' effort to save a patient who
would inevitably die in spite of all known treatment, the giving of the
same drugs to a mildly ill patient who could be cured by more conserva-

tive procedures is far less 'reasonable'. An action in tort against the doctor

would test the reasonable care in the doctor's over-all treatment in fact
situations such as these.
'
'
"'

W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 (1966).
Gray v. Wright, 142 W. Va. 490, 500, 96 S.E.2d 671, 676 (1957).
Baker v. Hendrix, 126 W. Va. 37, 27 S.E.2d 275 (1943).
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Morgan v. Grace Hospital, Inc.' Morgan introduced the
"discovery rule" which holds that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the patient either learns of the negligence
or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of
it.,13

The issue of plaintiff's actual knowledge or constructive
knowledge of the defendant's negligence is one of fact, not law,
34
and, therefore, must be resolved by the jury.
E. Hospital Immunity and Liability
There is no longer any distinction in West Virginia between
the liability of a private (for profit) hospital and a charitable hospital. Both are vicariously liable for the negligence of their employees
under the doctrine of respondeatsuperior.'3 Hospitals may be liable for injuries which proximately result from the negligence of a
nurse,'1 an intern,' 3 or a staff radiologist.lu
In West Virginia jurisprudence, better than 85% of all the
appellate malpractice cases involve claims arising at a hospital.
Thus, the exposure of a hospital to claims is significant. Many of
these claims involved alleged tortious conduct by independent
contractor physicians. West Virginia generally recognizes the rule
that a hospital is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor.'35 Hospitals can also be guilty of primary negligence when they
fail to observe the proper standard of care in the selection of competent employees."
There have been a number of direct negligence suits against
1- 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).
'1 Hill v. Clarke, 241 S.E.2d 572 (W. Va. 1978).

l3 Id. at 573. See also: Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 7 (1976).
"'

Adkins v. St. Francis Hosp., 149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965); Hogan

v. Clarksburg Hosp. Co., 63 W. Va. 84, 59 S.E. 943 (1907).
'' Duling v. Bluefield Sanitarium, Inc., 149 W. Va. 567, 142 S.E.2d 754 (1965).
iWligerod v. Sharafabadi, 151 W. Va. 995, 158 S.E.2d 175 (1967).
'' Jenkins v. Charleston Gen. Hosp. & Training School, 90 W. Va. 230, 110
S.E. 560 (1922).

Vaughan v. Memorial Hosp., 100 W. Va. 290, 130 S.E. 481 (1925) (dicta).
Meade v. St. Francis Hosp., 137 W. Va. 834, 74 S.E.2d 405 (1953); Fisher
v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 137 W. Va. 723, 73 S.E.2d 667 (1952); Koehler v.
Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 137 W. Va. 764, 73 S.E.2d 673 (1952); Roberts v.
'

"

Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp., 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S.E. 318 (1925).
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hospitals for maintaining unsafe premises."' The duty of care
which a hospital owes to a patient for maintaining a safe environment is very important since many patients have impaired capacity due to their sickness or medications."'
Governmental immunity for certain hospitals may persist in
West Virginia.'4 3 Yet, the doctrine of immunity is not absolute. A
public institution may plead the defense of sovereign immunity if
it can establish4 that its function is "governmental" rather than
"proprietary."' A rebuttable presumption exists that governmental bodies do act in their "governmental" capacity.' Shaffer appears to be a shaky but existing precedent for public hospital immunity. The definition of public hospital appears to be limited to
West Virginia State Hospitals and those wholly owned and operated by a county.' 4'
CONCLUSION

The law of medical malpractice in West Virginia has developed slowly and, in general, consistently. The new horizon of informed consent remains uncharted. The wisdom and necessity of
the expert witness rule is firmly entrenched. Yet, there is an uneasiness in some quarters regarding our system of resolving medical
malpractice cases.
Mandatory arbitration statutes have risen and fallen and risen
again across the country. Statutory limitations on verdicts have
generally proved to be unconstitutional.
The concern to be addressed is the protection of the injured
patient's rights without a premature destruction of the medical
doctor's career. The stigma of being sued for malpractice is real.
Like an indictment, a malpractice suit publicized in a newspaper
can have dire consequences.
M Tedesco v. Weirton Gen. Hosp., 235 S.E.-2d 463 (W. Va. 1977); Adkins v.
St. Francis Hosp., 149 W. Va. 705, 143 S.E.2d 154 (1965); Koehler v. Ohio Valley
Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 137 W. Va. 723, 73 S.E.2d 667 (1952); Hogan v. Clarksburg
Hosp., 63 W. Va. 84, 59 S.E. 943 (1907).
142Hogan v. Clarksburg Hosp., 63 W. Va. 84, 59 S.E. 943 (1907).
",

Shaffer v. Monangalia Gen. Hosp., 135 W. Va. 163, 62 S.E.2d 795 (1950).

I" Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting Corp., 146 W. Va. 130, 118 S.E.2d 622

(1961); Ward v. Raleigh County Court, 141 W. Va. 730, 93 S.E.2d 44 (1956).
Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 835, 30 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1944).
'
245 W. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 35; Boggs v. Board of Educ., 244 S.E.2d 799 (W.
Va. 1978).
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The frequency of malpractice cases being filed without benefit
of a prelitigation expert report in support of the plaintiffs claim
is appalling. Our courts have responded correctly to this situation
by granting summary judgment to defendants unless the plaintiff
can produce an expert witness within a reasonable time after the
filing of the suit and opportunity for discovery.
There is no call for limiting the access of alleged malpractice
victims to the courts of this state. On the contrary, the purpose and
thrust of this article has been to synthesize the law of malpractice
in West Virginia. Hopefully, doctors will not be sued unless there
is probable cause to believe that they were negligent and lawyers
will not take medical malpractice cases without a legitimate belief
that a successful verdict can be obtained as the development and
trial of a medical malpractice case is a very expensive proposition
both in terms of money advanced for expert opinions and legal
time.
The legal profession owes it to itself to eliminate the unfounded suits against physicians, to prosecute meritorious claims
against physicians, and to develop a system of continuing legal
education or specialization to achieve these goals. West Virginia is
capable of developing a legal education program which will create
malpractice specialists statewide who can competently evaluate,
prepare, and try medical malpractice cases. This must be our commitment.
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